Άπό τήν Πάτρα, ρωμαϊκή ἀποικία τοῦ Αὐγούστου, προέρχεται μιά σειρά ἐπιτύμβιων στηλῶν πού μαρτυροῦν τήν τέλεση ἀγώνων μονομάχων στήν πόλη κατά τήν αὐτοκρατορική περίοδο. Οἱ παραστάσεις καί οἱ ἐπιγραφές τους θυμίζουν ἐκεῖνες ἀνάλογων μνημείων τοῦ ἐλληνικοῦ κόσμου τῆς ανατολῆς · συνιστοῦν, ὡστόσο, ἕνα πρωτότυπο καί ἄξιο προσοχῆς στοιχεῖο τῆς κοινωνικῆς καί πολιτιστικῆς ζωῆς τῆς πόλης στήν παραπάνω περίοδο.

Le déplacement opéré par Vatican II dans la théologie des ministères oblige à repenser l’unité du sacrement de l’ordre et la diversité des trois ministères ordonnés. Des questions nouvelles se posent au sujet du diaconat et spécialement de la sacramentalité de ce ministère. Deux pistes sont à explorer: le diaconat comme participation à la plénitude sacramentelle de l’épiscopat et sa confirmation sacramentelle au Christ-Serviteur. L’article explore ces pistes à la lumière de la théologie de S. Thomas d’Aquin sur le caractère (...) sacramentel et sa finalité. En partant des tria munera qui ont conduit Vatican II à affirmer la sacramentalité de l’épiscopat, on peut mettre en valeur la spécificité du ministère diaconal : alors que la collégialité de l’épiscopat est immédiatement destinée à l’exercice conjoint des tria munera, la structure propre de l’ordo diaconal destine celui-ci à exercer l’un ou l’autre des tria munera au sein de l’Église locale. De là apparaît la plénitude « ministérielle » qui caractérise le diaconat au sein du sacrement de l’ordre. (shrink)

At the risk of proving myself such a caviller, I want to ask a question which I have seldom heard raised, and which I have never seen discussed in anything that I have read about Berkeley. If I am right, it poses a problem for his immaterialism, not only different, but coming from a different direction, from those objections that are commonly levelled against him. If I am wrong, it will show how right Berkeley was to stress the difficulty of (...) using for one purpose our language which has become fashioned for another. At least, I hope that I shall not fail to be the ‘fair and ingenuous reader’for whom he asked. (shrink)

An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingentThere are two main issues to address. the first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this (...) still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. the second is Fred Dretske's claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that (a) ‘non‐epistemic’perception can be understood only by employing the concept of ‘epistemic’perception; (b) that the former can occur only partially—i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and (c) that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition's concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with ‘doxastic’force. (shrink)

A. D. M. Walker; III*—Gratefulness and Gratitude, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 39–56, https://doi.org/10.1093.

A. D. Smith; VI*—The Self and the Good, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 85, Issue 1, 1 June 1985, Pages 101–118, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.

В книге дается анализ основных характерных признаков русской философии, позволяющие выделить ее как нечто особенное из общего контекста философских культур.

Moral theories which, like those of Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas, give a central place to the virtues, tend to assume that as traits of character the virtues are mutually compatible so that it is possible for one and the same person to possess them all. This assumption—let us call it the compatibility thesis—does not deny the existence of painful moral dilemmas: it allows that the virtues may conflict in particular situations when considerations associated with different virtues favour incompatible courses of (...) action, but holds that these conflicts occur only at the level of individual actions. Thus while it may not always be possible to do both what would be just and what would be kind or to act both loyally and honestly, it is possible to be both a kind and a just person and to have both the virtue of loyalty and the virtue of honesty. (shrink)

An examination of British and French weights exchanged between the Royal Society and the Académie royale des sciences in the 1730s has led to a re‐assessment of the Elizabethan troy standards from the Exchequer and the suggestion that the mass of the troy pound has been revised upwards. In turn this is used to support the idea of an evolutionary relationship between the early bullion ounces of England, France, and the Low Countries.

In her careful consideration of my book, The Problem of Perception (henceforth, PP), Susanna Siegel highlights what she takes to be a number of shortcomings in the work. First, she suggests that a sense‐datum theorist has two options–what she calls the “complex sense‐data option” and the “two‐factor option”–that survive the argument of my book unscathed. I consider these two options in the first two sections of this reply. Secondly, she criticizes my suggestion that there are three and only three basic (...) and independent sources of perceptual consciousness: an issue I take up in my third section. Thirdly, she expresses reservations about my response to the argument from hallucination. In particular, she argues that the phenomenological considerations on which I put so much weight cannot settle the fundamental issue here. I address this criticism in the fourth section of this reply. Finally, she spends a certain amount of time discussing the notion of a “veridicality‐rele‐vant property”, a topic to which I devote the concluding section of this reply. (shrink)

An assessment is made of Rudolf Otto's criticisms of Friedrich Schleiermacher's claim that religious feeling is to be interpreted as essentially involving a feeling of absolute dependence. Otto's criticisms are divided into two kinds. The first suggest that a feeling a dependence, even an absolute one, is the wrong sort of feeling to locate at the heart of religious consciousness. It is argued that this criticism is based on misinterpretations of Schleiermacher's view, which is in fact much closer to Otto's (...) than the latter appreciated. The second kind of criticism suggests that the feeling of absolute dependence cannot play the foundational role assigned to it by Schleiermacher, since it is itself a secondary response. It is argued not only that Otto provides no justification for this criticism, but that Otto's own position is incoherent unless Schleiermacher's view is accepted. (shrink)

(1992). Grain packing in early standard capacity measures: Evidence from the scottish dry capacity standards. Annals of Science: Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 337-350.

discussion de l'auteur. peu de théorie additionnelle. question de l'acceptation de la punition p330.

The Problem of Perception offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of ...